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Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-
First Century. By Margaret M. Blair.* Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1995. Pp. vii, 371. $34.95 (hbk.), $14.95 (pbk.).
I
Scholarly interest in corporate law has fluctuated during this century. In
1932, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means defined the field for subsequent
generations with their treatise on "the separation of ownership and control."'
Indeed, so influential was Berle and Means's work that corporate law became
intellectually moribund in the postwar era,2 only to be revived when the law-
and-economics movement turned its attention to the dilemma posed by the
Berle-Means thesis.3 For most scholars, the agency problems between
management and stockholders remain the critical issue,4 but Margaret M. Blair
imaginatively applies law and economics to promote the cause of a different
constituency: workers. Thus, Blair brings the debate over corporate law back
to its normative roots in the legal realism of Berle and Means, who (as is often
forgotten) argued that the separation of ownership and control, by unbundling
the traditional attributes of ownership, deprived stockholders of their sole claim
to corporate profits and entitled the people to demand that corporations be
managed in the interests of workers and "all society.
' 6
Ownership is the right to an asset's residual returns and to control over the
asset (p. 27). Blair argues that stockholders are not a corporation's sole
residual claimants and therefore should not be deemed its sole owners and
granted exclusive control. Because many employees embody firm-specific
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1. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
5 (Transaction Publishers 1991) (1932). This book was "without question the most influential book on
corporate America ever written." DANIEL R. FISCHEL, PAYBACK: THE CONSPIRACY TO DESTROY MICHAEL
MILKEN AND HIs FINANCIAL REVOLUTION 12 (1995).
2. See Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923, 923 (1984).
3. Ralph K. Winter, Foreword to ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW
at ix, ix-x (1993).
4. See, e.g., ROMANO, supra note 3, at 1.
5. See, e.g., FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 12-14 (summarizing Berle-Means thesis as concerned with
shareholder-management agency costs without mentioning normative position of Berle and Means).
6. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 312; see also MORTON J. HORWITI, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960, at 166-67 (1992) (discussing normative position of Berle and Means);
Romano, supra note 2, at 936-37 (same).
7. See, e.g., PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT
289-91 (1992).
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human capital, they too are rewarded with a share of the firm's residual returns
(pp. 15-16, 230-32).8 Blair's argument that workers should be given a share
of control and perhaps of equity ultimately falters on the impossibility of
measuring firm-specific human capital, the difficulty of devising effective
means of governance to maximize returns to diverse constituencies, and the
existence of alternative ways of compensating workers for their firm-specific
human capital. Nevertheless, Blair's provocative use of efficiency arguments
to redefine employees as part-owners of their firms should stimulate further
research and practical experimentation.
II
Blair emphasizes that, despite continuing debates in corporate law such as
that over hostile takeovers, 9 there is a nearly universal consensus among
scholars that a corporation's primary goal is to maximize the value of the
stockholders' shares (pp. 12, 95-115, 122).10 This is deemed a corporation's
proper purpose because shareholders bear the residual risk and receive the
residual returns from the firm's business (pp. 15, 228-29). Others who deal
with a company, including employees, protect their interests by contract
(p. 210). 11 Stockholders' exposure to the hazards of the firm's business gives
them the greatest incentive to monitor the firm to ensure that it maximizes
profits.'2 Thus, enhancing stock value should be corporations' goal.
Blair criticizes this consensus on efficiency grounds, drawing on the work
of economists who have recognized the existence of firm-specific human
capital for thirty years. 3 She turns the economists' insight into a new basis
for greater worker involvement in firms' governance, which some critics of
corporate law have previously advocated on political grounds. 14 Since some
workers have firm-specific skills, she argues that, like stockholders, they share
8. Blair argues both that workers who have firm-specific skills often already share in residual returns,
and that such workers should share in both residual returns (perhaps through stock ownership) and control
(pp. 15-16, 326).
9. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981) (arguing against permitting defensive
tactics by target's management); Ronald J. Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in
Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1982) (arguing that defensive tactics should be permitted to
extent they facilitate competing bids without preventing takeovers); see also infra note 21 and
accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 36, 67-70, 90-91 (1991); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF
CAPITALISM 298, 304-06 (1985).
11. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 10, at 36, 90-91.
12. Id. at 68, 90-91.
13. See GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL 19-20, 26 (2d ed. 1975). Becker's work distinguishing
firm-specific from general human capital was first published in 1964.
14. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, AFTER THE REVOLUTION? 115-40 (1970).
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in the firm's residual returns (pp. 230-32).' 5 Accordingly, managing a firm
so as to maximize only the residual gains to stockholders risks inefficiency in
the event that the firm's revenues suffice to provide returns to firm-specific
human capital but not to equity. Existing doctrine then encourages management
to fire workers or even discontinue operations, squandering human capital that
should remain productively employed (pp. 256-57).6
Blair therefore urges directors to recognize a duty to maximize returns to
firm-specific human capital as well as equity (pp. 239-40, 324-26). Although
she refers to changing "[t]he law and the culture of the boardroom" (p. 239),
she advocates no major changes in corporate law; rather, she favors increasing
employee ownership and control under existing laws. She urges firms to
experiment with various ways of achieving this goal, such as employee stock
ownership plans (ESOPs), worker-management committees, and corporate
pension-fund investment in employees' own firms (pp. 328-37). She also urges
a change in boards' conception of corporate purpose. Whether or not workers
own stock, she argues, those with firm-specific human capital should be
deemed stakeholders with rights to share in control of the firm and in its
residual returns (but she does not clarify whether directors' duty to
nonstockholder workers should be legally enforceable by some form of
fiduciary duty transcending the employment contract) (p. 326).
II
The existing legal framework gives companies much flexibility to
experiment with alternative structures and goals, as Blair urges. ESOPs and
other forms of employee ownership are common. Like Blair's call for
experimentation with corporate forms, her recommended attitudinal change is
not necessarily radical, in light of the corporate culture that favors maximizing
long-term entity value, as opposed to seeking short-term stock-price
increases. 7 Corporate law, as Blair notes, does not compel boards to act
solely to maximize stockholder value (pp. 93, 211-23). A corporation may be
15. Firm-specific human capital is valuable only to the firm at which the workers have obtained it
through training and experience. Once the workers develop such capital, therefore, they are in a position
to bargain for compensation higher than the market value of their general human capital; the firm has an
incentive to pay them such higher compensation, effectively sharing the quasi-rents generated by the firm-
specific human capital (pp. 251,256-57). Blair argues that such compensation represents sharing in residual
returns, since it is contingent on the success of the firm (pp. 231, 257), but her conclusion that workers'
exposure to their employers' varying fortunes mandates giving them a share in control does not follow. See
infra text accompanying notes 30-32.
16. Cf Sidney G. Winter, Routines, Cash Flows, and Unconventional Assets: Corporate Change in
the 1980s, in THE DEAL DECADE 55, 74-79 (Margaret M. Blair ed., 1993) (arguing that layoffs sacrificing
human capital may be efficient if high interest rates depress such capital's value, but inefficient if long-term
intangible value lost exceeds short-term cash gained).
17. See JAY V. LORSCH & ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF
AMERICA'S CORPORATE BOARDS 43-47 (1989).
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chartered to pursue any lawful purpose," and many corporations (such as
newspaper publishers) temper profit maximization with other social goals.' 9
During ordinary operations, directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation
and are free to weigh competing claims of employees, stockholders, and other
constituents within the mantle of the business judgment rule (pp. 56-58).20
Even when a bidder for a firm offers stockholders a premium for their shares,
the target board has some discretion to weigh the interests of stakeholders such
as employees in deciding whether to resist the offer.2'
Yet Blair is surely right that the prevailing attitude informing corporate
law remains that corporations are to serve the stockholders by maximizing
share value.22 Thus, only stockholders may legally enforce directors' fiduciary
duties, while employees are left to their contracts.23 Widespread corporate
layoffs, even in profitable firms at a time of economic growth, dramatize the
vulnerability of human capital under existing law.
Nevertheless, Blair's argument that workers should share in control and
residual returns suffers from several weaknesses. First, as she admits,
economists have yet to devise a reliable measure of firm-specific human capital
(p. 263).24 Since (as Blair acknowledges) workers are compensated for their
general skills by their contractual pay and benefits (pp. 230, 263-65), the
inability separately to measure firm-specific skills undermines her claim that
appropriate shares in residual returns and control, commensurate with firm-
specific skills, can be determined. Financial capital is homogeneous and
quantifiable, so it is simple to apportion both votes and dividend and
18. ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 1.2.3, at 17 (1986); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 102(a)(3) (1994).
19. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 10, at 36.
20. See 1 R. FRANKLIN BALOTri & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.6, at 4-56 to 4-58 (2d ed. 1990 & Supp. 1995) (noting broad directorial
discretion to manage corporation for any rational business purpose, perhaps even for sole benefit of
workers); PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 162 (1990) (same).
21. In the middle of the 1980s takeover wave, the Supreme Court of Delaware, the leading state of
incorporation for large firms, held that target boards could consider takeover bids' impact on constituencies
other than stockholders in deciding whether to resist offers. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). The court soon limited this aspect of board discretion, holding that once a firm
is for sale, its board may consider other constituencies' interests only to the extent such consideration is
rationally related to benefiting stockholders. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d
173, 182 (Del. 1986). Despite Revlon, targets' directors may still weigh interests other than those of
stockholders in deciding to resist the sale of their firms. See Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp.,
535 A.2d 1334, 1341-42 (Del. 1987); see also I BALOTIri & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 20, § 4.6, at 4-58
n.206 (discussing Delaware case law on targets' consideration of nonstockholder constituencies in
responding to takeover offers). For a discussion of other states' antitakeover "stakeholder" statutes, see
ROMANO, supra note 3, at 56.
22. See I BALOTrI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 20, § 4.10(C)(5) at 4-247; CLARK, supra note 18,
§ 1.2.3, at 17-18; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 419-21 (4th ed. 1992); WEILER,
supra note 20, at 161-62.
23. See, e.g., ROMANO, supra note 3, at 58 (noting that antitakeover stakeholder statutes do not create
enforceable rights for workers).
24. See LESTER C. THUROW, INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL 92 (1970); Sherwin Rosen,
Transactions Costs and Internal Labor Markets, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 49, 51 (1988).
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liquidation rights among stockholders?2 Human capital, by contrast, is
difficult to measure, diverse, and often not attributable to any particular
employee or group of employees. 26 The inability to measure firm-specific
human capital suggests that negotiated compensation in a competitive labor
market is the best measure of an employee's value to the firm, i.e., his or her
marginal productivity.27 Giving workers control rights with which to
appropriate a share of a firm's profits risks overcompensating them relative to
their productivity.
Making firms answerable to different groups with diverse, sometimes
hostile interests (such as investors and various categories of workers) would
also impose substantial management costs as participants struggled to set
policy and allocate rewards among themselves.28 Blair acknowledges this
problem (p. 326), but her sanguine acceptance of the fragmentation of
corporate boards into rival factions representing labor and capital is
unpersuasive. Corporations with conflicting goals and divided boards would
surely be less efficient than those devoted primarily to seeking profits and
directed by boards answerable to one group alone.
Finally, Blair's argument that workers with firm-specific skills should be
given new rights to control their firms and share in profits does not adequately
acknowledge that such workers already are rewarded for their firm-specific
skills, and that there are important reasons for using arm's-length bargaining
rather than employee ownership to determine worker compensation. Blair does
not refute the orthodox claim that workers are contractually compensated for
their firm-specific as well as transferable skills.29 Indeed, she cites evidence
that they are compensated (pp. 230-31). If workers have already bargained for
payment for their special skills, however, claiming a share of control and
equity as compensation for the same skills is double dipping. Blair argues that
the existence of compensation packages that are more generous than employees
could receive for their general skills at rival firms demonstrates that workers
share in residual returns and should therefore be granted a commensurate share
25. See Henry Hansmann, Ownership of the Firm, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 267, 277-80, 283
(1988).
26. See THUROW, supra note 24, at 93 (noting that workers' knowledge of firm-specific physical
capital is firm-specific human capital); WILLIAMSON, supra note 10, at 246-47 (noting that teamwork skills
are one form of firm-specific human capital); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the
Human Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits,
37 STAN. L. REv. 313, 357, 368 (1985) (noting that such firm-specific human capital as reputation and
client relationships often resides in firm as whole); Benjamin Klein, Vertical Integration as Organizational
Ownership: The Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 199,
207-08 (1988) (arguing that firm-specific team expertise not attributable to individual or small group
capable of withholding it is owned by equity owners of firm).
27. Cf. Hansmann, supra note 25, at 295-96 (noting difficulty of measuring employee productivity
in employee-owned firms where workers' skills are diverse).
28. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 10, at 38, 69-70; WILLIAMSON, supra note 10, at
311-12, 324; Hansmann, supra note 25, at 294-95.
29. See, e.g., MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 7, at 332-33, 345.
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of control to protect their stake in these returns (pp. 230-31). Employees who
receive contractual compensation for their firm-specific human capital,
however, by definition do not share in residual returns.30 To the extent that
compensation for firm-specific skills is not fi :ed but contingent, such pay is
better understood not as an attribute of ownership, but as a form of bonding
to control the moral hazard of shirking and as a bargained sharing of the
profits generated by such skills so as to maintain the relationship between
workers and firm. This is advantageous to both sides because workers with
such skills are more productive at their current employer both than they would
be elsewhere, and than new hires lacking their skills.3' Protecting workers'
interests in such contingent compensation by means of a share in control,
rather than by means of the ongoing, incomplete contract between workers and
the firm, would vitiate the compensation's bonding effect and impair the firm's
flexibility when changed circumstances reduce the skills' value.32
IV
Blair does not employ the leftist rhetoric of earlier advocates of worker
self-determination.33 Only rarely does she hint that normative concerns other
than efficiency might motivate her commitment to enhancing the status of
employees in corporate decisionmaking: "[E]mployees who embody [a firm's]
critical resources have important and inalienable control rights over the use of
those resources" (p. 292) (emphasis added). In today's political and intellectual
climate, such an argument can only hope for success if it is couched in the
fashionable language of law and economics. Blair's work is not fully
successful, but it should entice sympathetic economists to refine their
yardsticks of human capital and corporate architects to experiment with new
forms of worker participation. Such experimentation is her major goal
(pp. 337-38), and organizational experimentation under flexible laws in a
market economy is the best way to allow efficient firms to evolve.34
-Jai K. Chandrasekhar
30. See id. at 291.
31. See id. at 214,333; Oliver D. Hart, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Finn, 4 J.L. ECON.
& ORGANIZATION 119, 125 (1988).
32. Cf. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 10, at 38-39 (arguing that layoffs enhance efficiency
of firms individually and collectively, enhancing economy's net ability to sustain employment); FISCHEL,
supra note 1, at 33 (same); Harold Demsetz, The Theory of the Finn Revisited, 4 J.L. ECON. &
ORGANIZATION 141, 153-54 (1988) (discussing corporate takeovers' role in eliminating firm-specific human
capital no longer needed for productivity).
33. See, e.g., CHARLES A. REICH, THE GREENING OF AMIERICA 314, 345 (1970); JAROSLAV VANEK,
THE PARTICIPATORY ECONOMY 94, 106-13 (1971).
34. See ROMANO, supra note 3, at 9, 148-51; WILLIAMSON, supra note 10, at 295.
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